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MAIN POINTS 
1.  Zambia has paid among the best nominal seed cotton prices to farmers in SSA since 1995. 
2.  By a more refined measure (share of FOT), during 1995-1999, Zambia paid prices comparable to 
those in Tanzania (a very competitive sector), and substantially higher than in Mozambique and 
WCA. However, from 2000-2005, Zambia's pricing performance fell, and exceeded only 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique in our sample 
3.  The recently announced reference price for 2008 of ZKW 1,200/kg of seed cotton was negotiated 
and jointly announced by ginners and farmers.  It amounts to about 53% of FOT at current 
exchange rates and Index A prices; about equal to recent shares received by farmers in Zambia, but 
well below levels in WCA and Tanzania. 
4.   What “rules of the game” are needed for farmers and ginners to continue working together so that 
the costs and benefits in Zambia’s cotton sector are shared equitably? 
 
INTRODUCTION: Prices are one key 
determinant, along with productivity and cost of 
production, of the returns farmers earn from the 
crops that they grow and sell.  They are thus an 
important element in the ability of a crop like 
cotton, produced almost entirely by poor 
smallholder farmers, to reduce poverty.   
OBJECTIVE and METHODS: Cotton sectors 
are organized in a wide variety of fashions in sub-
saharan Africa.  A recent study of nine SSA 
countries identified publicly-owned national 
monopolies (Mali and Cameroon), local 
monopolies in which private firms hold monopoly 
rights in defined geographical zones 
(Mozambique and, most recently, Burkina Faso), 
concentrated market-based sectors in which 2-3 
private firms dominate the cotton market 
(Zimbabwe and Zambia), competitive sectors in 
which many private firms compete vigorously for 
seed cotton (Tanzania), and hybrid sectors which 
combine elements of different types (Benin and 
Uganda).  Theory predicts that competitive sectors 
such as Tanzania’s will pay better prices to 
farmers than unregulated national or local 
monopolies, and that prices in concentrated 
systems (such as Zambia's) depend very much on 
the dominant companies' behavior.  This Policy 
Synthesis draws on recent comparative work  
across the nine countries listed above to describe 
approaches to price setting across SSA, and to 
assess pricing performance in Zambia compared 
to the other eight.  In the final section, we discuss 
key policy implications for Zambia. 
PRICING MECHANISMS IN WEST-
CENTRAL AFRICA (WCA):  Pricing 
mechanisms in francophone WCA countries are 
remarkably similar, based on a commonly 
accepted principle that single channel systems 
require guaranteed fixed prices throughout the 
cotton-growing area (panterritorial), throughout 
the cropping season (panseasonal), and announced 
before planting (Table 1).  
In the 1970s and most of the 1980s, Ministries of 
Agriculture announced the producer price before 
planting, and the cotton company was mandated 
to collect all cotton and pay farmers.  In recent 
years, to bring flexibility and reduce financial 
risks, most WCA countries have reformed their 
pricing systems with a two-tier payment linked to 
world prices: a base price negotiated at the 
beginning at planting and a price complement to 
be paid at the end of the season, if the cotton 
company makes a profit (Cameroon) or if the 
actual sales price is above the base price (Burkina 
and Mali). Initial producer prices, administratively   2
set until the end of the last decade, are now 
typically agreed prior to the planting season 
through direct negotiation between cotton 
companies and farmers, or, in some countries 
(Burkina and Mali) through a commonly agreed 
pricing formula within an “Inter-Professional 
Committee”. These formulas now formally link 
producer prices to world market prices.  
In all countries of WCA until 2004, pricing was 
linked to a stabilization fund designed to limit 
fluctuations in producer prices and avoid having 
them fall under some minimum. Only one of these 
funds (in Cameroon) survived the 2004 crisis, 
when world prices fell 30% during the marketing 
season; even Cameroon’s fund was exhausted in 
subsequent years. The collapse of the stabilization 
funds in WCA created major financial crises, 
requiring large budgetary transfers to the cotton 
sectors in Mali, Benin and Burkina.  
PRICING MECHANISMS IN EAST AND 
SOUTHERN AFRICA (ESA):  Prior to reforms 
in the early 1990s, cotton pricing mechanisms in 
ESA closely resembled those of WCA in the sense 
that a cotton parastatal (or cooperative union in 
Tanzania and Uganda) was the sole buyer of 
cotton at a preannounced, panseasonal and 
panterritorial price. Following reforms, pricing 
mechanisms in the region became more market-
linked and flexible and diversified in line with the 
diverse sectoral types that have emerged (Table 
2). As a result, no country in the region operates a 
stabilization fund, and none have generated 
sector-wide deficits that government had to cover. 
Mozambique has the only (local) monopoly 
system in the region, and is the only country that 
maintains a fully administered, panseasonal and 
panterritorial price. Government’s role in price 
setting is strong in Mozambique, due in part to the 
very weak state of farmer organizations in the 
country. In Zambia and Zimbabwe’s concentrated 
sectors, pre-planting prices have been maintained 
but this reflects business decisions by the 
dominant firms; government has no say in pricing 
in either country. Prices paid to farmers 
throughout the region are much more strongly 
linked to Index A than in WCA, though the way in 
which this happens varies greatly. For example, 
prices in Zambia largely adjust only year-to-year, 
due to price leadership by Dunavant, while in 
Tanzania and to some extent in Zimbabwe they 
fluctuate throughout the marketing season. Even 
in Uganda’s hybrid system, which attempts to 
eliminate competition among firms, prices vary 
over the course of the marketing season. 
COMPARING PRICING PERFORMANCE:   
One way to assess pricing performance across 
countries is to compare the simple nominal price 
paid to farmers for a kg of seed cotton, as a 
percent of Index A.  By this measure, Zambia has 
performed relatively well, paying the second 
highest price share among all nine countries from 
1995 through 1999 (Zimbabwe was highest). 
From 2000-2005, Zambia was tied with Tanzania 
for the highest price paid in ESA, though its prices 
were well below those in WCA.   
This simple price comparison, however, suffers 
from a number of shortcomings. For example, 
some countries achieve higher ginning outturn 
ratios than others, which should allow companies 
in those countries to pay higher prices for seed 
cotton.  Other countries (such as Zambia) achieve 
high price premia on the world market, which 
should also allow them to pay higher seed cotton 
prices (as long as the costs of achieve this 
premium do not exceed the premium itself).   
Finally, countries differ in the costs of assembling 
seed cotton from farmers, and in the costs of 
transporting the lint cotton to its FOB port.   
To correct for these factors, we calculate the share 
of the FOT (free on truck; an ex-ginnery price) 
lint price received by farmers in each of the study 
countries over the past 10 years (Figure 1). 
Producer prices for seed cotton are adjusted to lint 
equivalent using the average ginning outturn ratio, 
and input costs borne by the companies are added 
to this result, to show the net value received by 
farmers. The Cotlook A Index is then adjusted to 
FOT based on transport and port cost data. 
Estimates of average quality premia for each 
country (see PS#23) are then added to estimate the 
value received by the ginner at the ginnery door. 
The ratio of these two values—that paid to 
farmers by the ginners and that received by 
ginners at the factory door—shows the share of 
FOT paid to farmers. The FOT lint price is chosen 
instead of FOB because FOT is the price most 
within the companies’ control. Transport costs 
from FOT to FOB tend to be higher in landlocked 
countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Uganda, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe) than in coastal countries 
(Cameroon, Mozambique, and Tanzania). Thus, 
for example we estimate costs from FOT to FOBTable 1: Summary of Pricing Mechanisms in WCA Countries as of 2006 
  Benin Mali  Burkina  Cameroon 
Administered price?  Mixed  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Panterritorial, 
panseasonal? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 











Announced prior to 
planting? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted prior to harvest?  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Secondary payment after 
marketing? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Linked to A Index?  Yes in principle, not 
so clearly in practice 
Yes   Yes   Yes in principle, not 
so clearly in practice 
Stabilization fund?  Yes, but exhausted  Yes, but exhausted  Yes, but exhausted  Yes, but exhausted 
Sector wide deficits?  Yes  Yes (estimated 
US$91 million for 
2005 alone ) 
Yes (estimated €110 
million, 2004/05-
2005/06) 
None through 2007 
Table 2: Summary of Pricing Mechanisms in ESA Countries as of 2006 
Mozambique Zambia  Zimbabwe  Tanzania  Uganda  Pricing 
Element  Local Monop  Concentrated  Concentrated  Competitive  Hybrid 
Administered 
price? 




Yes Yes  for  individual 
companies,  
but prices vary 
across company 
Yes for individual 
companies, but 
prices vary across 
company 
No Only  pre-planting 
price 
Pan-seasonal? Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
How set?  Negotiated btwn 
government and 
ginners; very little 
direct role of 
farmers 
Dunavant acts as 
price leader 
Price leadership by 
Cottco and Cargill 
Competitive 









No Yes,  only  by 
Dunavant 






N/A Yes  Continually 
adjusted over 
season due to 
hyper-inflation 
N/A Not  formally,  but 






No No  Yes  (Cottco  and 
Cargill only) 
No No 
Linked to A 
Index? 
Yes in principle, 
not so clearly in 
practice 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Stabilization 
fund? 
No No No  No  No 
Sector wide 
deficits? 
No No No  No  No 
 
 
3  Figure 1.  Share of FOT Received by Cotton Farmers in Nine SSA countries, 1995-2005 
TZ, Uganda: Competitive 
sectors, consistently good prices  




















































to be 50% higher in Zimbabwe (US$0.157 per 
kg of lint) than in Tanzania (US$0.105) entirely 
due to geography. Note that, due to differential 
transport costs, seed cotton prices in US$ terms 
may be lower in Uganda than in Tanzania, but 
the share of FOT paid to farmers may be larger.  
Four patterns stand out. First, prices paid in 
WCA increased sharply during the second 
period (2000-2005), but the prices during this 
period are not sustainable, as indicated by the 
large sectoral deficits that these countries have 
experienced in recent years.  Second, 
Mozambique, a poorly regulated local monopoly 
system with very weak farmer representation, 
has consistently paid the lowest prices of any 
country.  Third, Tanzania and Uganda, with 
highly competitive structures, have consistently 
paid attractive prices to farmers.  Finally, the 
two concentrated sectors – Zambia and 
Zimbabwe – paid attractive prices to farmers 
during the first period (1995-1999), even 
matching those in Tanzania and Uganda.  Yet 
those prices fell (quite sharply in Zimbabwe, less 
so in Zambia) during the second period.  During 
this period, average FOT price shares in Zambia 
were lower than any country other than 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe.   
POLICY IMPLICATIONS:  Zambian Cotton 
Pre-Financiers’ Association recently negotiated 
an indicative pre-planting price of ZKW 
1,200/kg with the Cotton Association of Zambia.  
This price was then jointly announced and 
supported by government, though the 
announcement made it clear the final price could 
differ from the announced price.  Equivalent to 
USD0.315/kg at current exchange rates, the 
announced price amounts to about 53% of 
Zambia’s FOT at current Index A prices 
(USD0.717/lb).  This share is about equal to the 
average FOT share that farmers have received in 
Zambia since 2000, and is well below the current 
levels of 66% in WCA and 75% in Tanzania.  
The collaborative fashion in which ginners and 
farmer representatives have negotiated prices 
this year bodes well for future collaboration.  As 
such negotiations continue to take place, it is 
crucial that both sides be fully informed about 
world market conditions, about price premia that 
Zambian cotton receives in international 
markets, and about reasonable cost structures 
that can be used to assess what prices can be 
sustainably paid in Zambia, so that the benefits 
of cotton cultivation and processing are 
equitably shared across all sector participants. 
 
This Policy Synthesis draws directly from Tschirley et al (2007). 
“Comparative Analysis of Organization and Performance of African 
Cotton Sectors:  Learning from Experience of Cotton Sector Reform in 
Africa”, forthcoming from World Bank 
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